Resilient Containment Control of Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Systems Against Unbounded Sensor and Actuator Attacks
Shan Zuo, Yi Zhang, Yichao Wang
TL;DR
This work addresses resilient containment control for heterogeneous multi-agent systems under unbounded, correlated sensor attacks and unbounded actuator attacks. It introduces a distributed attack-resilient framework that integrates dynamic observers and a Lyapunov-based analysis, yielding uniform ultimate boundedness (UUB) of the containment error $e(t)$ despite adversarial injections. Gains are obtained via Riccati-based design with adaptive components to estimate sensor/actuator attacks, and the approach is proven to keep followers within the leaders' convex hull under the stated assumptions. Simulation demonstrates clear resilience gains over conventional methods, highlighting practical implications for secure distributed control in cyber-physical networks.
Abstract
Accurate local state measurement is important to ensure the reliable operation of distributed multi-agent systems (MAS). Existing fault-tolerant control strategies generally assume the sensor faults to be bounded and uncorrelated. In this paper, we study the ramifications of allowing the sensor attack injections to be unbounded and correlated. These malicious sensor attacks may bypass the conventional attack-detection methods and compromise the cooperative performance and even stability of the distributed networked MAS. Moreover, the attackers may gain access to the actuation computing channels and manipulate the control input commands. To this end, we consider the resilient containment control problem of general linear heterogeneous MAS in the face of correlated and unbounded sensor attacks, as well as general unbounded actuator attacks. We propose an attack-resilient control framework to guarantee the uniform ultimate boundedness of the closed-loop dynamical systems and preserve the bounded containment performance. Compared with existing literature addressing bounded faults and/or disturbances that are unintentionally caused in the sensor and actuator channels, the proposed control protocols are resilient against unknown unbounded attack signals simultaneously injected into sensor and actuator channels, and hence are more practical in the real-world security applications. A numerical example illustrates the efficacy of the proposed result, by highlighting the resilience improvement over the conventional cooperative control method.
