Manipulation of individual judgments in the quantitative pairwise comparisons method
M. Strada, K. Kułakowski
TL;DR
The paper addresses manipulation of decision outcomes produced by quantitative pairwise comparison methods (AHP) via micro-bribery, formalizing attacker roles and inconsistency constraints. It introduces two heuristic attack algorithms—Row and Matrix—that aim to promote a target alternative by altering as few pairwise judgments as possible while keeping the overall inconsistency below a threshold. Through Monte Carlo experiments, the Matrix algorithm generally achieves higher success rates and lower final inconsistency than the Row algorithm, especially as matrix size grows or the target alternatives are more distant in ranking. The study discusses detection challenges, suggesting that restricting access to experts and monitoring interaction patterns are practical defenses, and highlights the need for future work on algorithmic manipulation detection. The work contributes a concrete framework for assessing manipulation risk in PC-based decision processes and informs defense strategies against micro-bribery attacks.
Abstract
Decision-making methods very often use the technique of comparing alternatives in pairs. In this approach, experts are asked to compare different options, and then a quantitative ranking is created from the results obtained. It is commonly believed that experts (decision-makers) are honest in their judgments. In our work, we consider a scenario in which experts are vulnerable to bribery. For this purpose, we define a framework that allows us to determine the intended manipulation and present three algorithms for achieving the intended goal. Analyzing these algorithms may provide clues to help defend against such attacks.
