Tracking-based distributed equilibrium seeking for aggregative games
Guido Carnevale, Filippo Fabiani, Filiberto Fele, Kostas Margellos, Giuseppe Notarstefano
TL;DR
The paper addresses the challenge of computing exact (generalized) Nash equilibria in aggregative games over networks with partial information. It introduces two fully distributed TRADES schemes: Primal TRADES for problems with local constraints and Primal-Dual TRADES for problems with affine coupling constraints, each employing tracking mechanisms to estimate the aggregative variable and, in the constrained case, augmented primal-dual updates. Using a singular perturbation framework, the authors prove linear (global exponential) convergence to the (G)NE under suitable step-size and network conditions, without requiring compactness of local sets or global information. Numerical experiments on demand-response-like scenarios corroborate the theoretical results, showing favorable convergence behavior and competitive efficiency compared to state-of-the-art distributed methods. The work provides scalable, distributed tools for networked decision-making in smart grids and related applications, with a clear pathway for extensions to time-varying graphs and richer constraint structures.
Abstract
We propose fully-distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, (i) the projected pseudo-gradient descent and (ii) a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the aggregative variable. To handle coupling constraints arising in generalized settings, we propose another distributed algorithm based on (i) a recently emerged augmented primal-dual scheme and (ii) two tracking mechanisms to reconstruct, for each agent, both the aggregative variable and the coupling constraint satisfaction. Leveraging tools from singular perturbations analysis, we prove linear convergence to the Nash equilibrium for both schemes. Finally, we run extensive numerical simulations to confirm the effectiveness of our methods and compare them with state-of-the-art distributed equilibrium-seeking algorithms.
