Pure-Circuit: Tight Inapproximability for PPAD
Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender, Themistoklis Melissourgos
TL;DR
The paper introduces Pure-Circuit, a two-gate PPAD-complete intermediate problem that captures the essential hardness structure needed for large-constant inapproximability results. By reducing from Pure-Circuit, the authors derive tight, constant-factor hardness results for computing approximate Nash equilibria and well-supported equilibria across polymatrix, graphical, and threshold games, improving prior existential-constant bounds. The core approach leverages a PURIFY gate and robustness to simulate strong nontrivial constraints, enabling a direct and modular reduction path to multiple PPAD problems. This work thus provides a clean, unified framework to obtain large-constant PPAD hardness results and identifies Pure-Circuit as the canonical intermediate problem for future PPAD inapproximability research.
Abstract
The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the $\varepsilon$-Generalized-Circuit ($\varepsilon$-GCircuit) problem. Rubinstein (2018) showed that there exists a small unknown constant $\varepsilon$ for which $\varepsilon$-GCircuit is PPAD-hard, and subsequent work has shown hardness results for other problems in PPAD by using $\varepsilon$-GCircuit as an intermediate problem. We introduce Pure-Circuit, a new intermediate problem for PPAD, which can be thought of as $\varepsilon$-GCircuit pushed to the limit as $\varepsilon \rightarrow 1$, and we show that the problem is PPAD-complete. We then prove that $\varepsilon$-GCircuit is PPAD-hard for all $\varepsilon < 0.1$ by a reduction from Pure-Circuit, and thus strengthen all prior work that has used GCircuit as an intermediate problem from the existential-constant regime to the large-constant regime. We show that stronger inapproximability results can be derived by reducing directly from Pure-Circuit. In particular, we prove tight inapproximability results for computing approximate Nash equilibria and approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in graphical games, for finding approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, and for finding approximate equilibria in threshold games.
