Academic Co-authorship is a Risky Game

TL;DR

The paper tackles the problem of co-authorship credit dynamics using a first game-theory-based ultimatum framework to model disputes over author order. It provides quantitative baselines showing how the likelihood of issuing an ultimatum $P$ scales with the number of authors $A$ and with disparities in utility $U$ and contribution $C$, via $P = 0.18\ln(A) + 0.12$ and $P = 0.22 -0.04U + 0.09C$. It reports that average ultimatum rates range from about $21\%$ for two authors to $43\%$ for five authors, with the least-contributing authors benefiting most from ultimatums in many configurations. The work highlights significant variability across common co-authorship scenarios, discusses potential governance remedies (e.g., contribution contracts, explicit credit statements), and argues that current practices are not robust, providing a benchmark for evaluating reforms and future extensions to account for sociopolitical factors.

Abstract

Conducting a research project with multiple participants is a complex task that involves not only scientific but also multiple social, political, and psychological interactions. This complexity becomes particularly evident when it comes to navigating the selection process for the number and order of co-authors on the resulting manuscript for publication due to the current form of collaboration dynamics common in academia. There is currently no computational model to generate a data-driven suggestion that could be used as a baseline for understating these dynamics. To address this limitation, we have developed a first game-theory-based model to generate such a baseline for co-authorship. In our model, co-authors can issued an ultimatum to pause the publication of the manuscript until the underlying issue has been resolved. We modeled the effect of issuing one or more ultimatums and showed that they have a major impact on the ultimate number and position of co-authors and the length of the publication process. In addition, we explored the effect of two common relationships (student-advisor and colleague-colleague) on co-authorship scenarios. The results of our model are alarming and suggest that the current academic practices are not fit for purpose. Where they work, they work because of the integrity of researchers and not by a systematic design.

Figures (3)

• Figure 1: The influence of the authors' contributions and utilities from finishing the project on the rate that at least one author would raise an ultimatum, divided into (a) two, (b) five, and (c) eight authors (from left to right). The results are shown as an average of $n=10,000$ simulations.
• Figure 2: The influence of the (a) project's expected duration, (b) project's completion state, and (c) author's position on the rate it is beneficial to raise an ultimatum for at least one author, divided into the number of authors in the project. The results are shown as mean $\pm$ standard deviation of $n=100,000$ reparations.
• Figure 3: The rate an author would raise an ultimatum for different student-advisor(s) and colleagues co-authorship cases. The results are shown as average $\pm$ standard deviation of $n=100,000$ simulations.