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On the Distortion of Multi-winner Election Using Single-Candidate Ballots

Gennaro Auricchio, Zeyu Ren, Zihe Wang, Jie Zhang

TL;DR

The paper investigates distortion in multiwinner elections with single-candidate ballots in general metric spaces. It introduces the $\sigma$-ratio $\sigma = d_{\max}/d_{\min}$ and derives both lower and upper distortion bounds for non-strategyproof and strategyproof mechanisms, including a lower bound of $1+\frac{w-1}{w+1}(\sigma-1)$ and an upper bound of $1+2\sigma$ for SNTV, plus a strategyproof bound via Random Sequential Dictator of $<1+4\sigma$ when $w=2$. It also shows that truthful mechanisms are independent of irrelevant candidates, proves that no anonymous deterministic strategyproof mechanism can have finite distortion, and presents Sequential Dictator achieving $2(n-w)\sigma+1$ when anonymity is relaxed. These results clarify how the $\sigma$ parameter governs distortion and suggest directions for extending to higher-ranked ballots and alternative objectives.

Abstract

In this paper, we study the distortion bounds for voting mechanisms in multi-winner elections in general metric spaces. Our study pertains to the case in which each voter only reports her favorite candidate amongst $m$ possible choices. Given that candidates' locations are undisclosed to the mechanism, the mechanism has to form a $w-$winner committee based solely on the number of votes received by candidates. We establish distortion bounds for both truthful and non-truthful mechanisms. Our research highlights the significance of the $σ$ parameter, which represents the ratio between maximum and minimum distances among all candidate pairs. We show that the distortion is linear in $σ$. First, we demonstrate that all mechanisms possess a distortion greater than $1+\frac{w-1}{w+1}(σ-1)$. To give an upper bound, we study the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) mechanism, whose distortion is at most $1+2σ$. Second, we retrieve the upper bounds for strategyproof mechanisms. In particular, we infer an upper bound by examining the Random Sequential Dictator mechanism that achieves a distortion less than $1+4σ$ when $w=2$.

On the Distortion of Multi-winner Election Using Single-Candidate Ballots

TL;DR

The paper investigates distortion in multiwinner elections with single-candidate ballots in general metric spaces. It introduces the -ratio and derives both lower and upper distortion bounds for non-strategyproof and strategyproof mechanisms, including a lower bound of and an upper bound of for SNTV, plus a strategyproof bound via Random Sequential Dictator of when . It also shows that truthful mechanisms are independent of irrelevant candidates, proves that no anonymous deterministic strategyproof mechanism can have finite distortion, and presents Sequential Dictator achieving when anonymity is relaxed. These results clarify how the parameter governs distortion and suggest directions for extending to higher-ranked ballots and alternative objectives.

Abstract

In this paper, we study the distortion bounds for voting mechanisms in multi-winner elections in general metric spaces. Our study pertains to the case in which each voter only reports her favorite candidate amongst possible choices. Given that candidates' locations are undisclosed to the mechanism, the mechanism has to form a winner committee based solely on the number of votes received by candidates. We establish distortion bounds for both truthful and non-truthful mechanisms. Our research highlights the significance of the parameter, which represents the ratio between maximum and minimum distances among all candidate pairs. We show that the distortion is linear in . First, we demonstrate that all mechanisms possess a distortion greater than . To give an upper bound, we study the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) mechanism, whose distortion is at most . Second, we retrieve the upper bounds for strategyproof mechanisms. In particular, we infer an upper bound by examining the Random Sequential Dictator mechanism that achieves a distortion less than when .
Paper Structure (9 sections, 12 theorems, 40 equations)

This paper contains 9 sections, 12 theorems, 40 equations.

Key Result

theorem 1.1

It is impossible for any randomized mechanism to achieve a distortion smaller than $1+\frac{w-1}{w+1}(\sigma-1)$.

Theorems & Definitions (28)

  • theorem 1.1
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: Candidate Profile I
  • proof
  • lemma thmcounterlemma
  • theorem 1.2
  • definition thmcounterdefinition
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: Candidate Profile II
  • theorem 1.3
  • proof
  • definition thmcounterdefinition
  • ...and 18 more