Fine-Grained Cryptanalysis: Tight Conditional Bounds for Dense k-SUM and k-XOR
Itai Dinur, Nathan Keller, Ohad Klein
TL;DR
This work studies conditional hardness of dense average-case $k$-SUM and $k$-XOR under a standard conjecture, establishing near-optimality of known dense-regime algorithms for $k=3,4,5$ and partial results for larger $k$. The authors introduce a self-reduction that converts a sparse instance into many dense instances and an obfuscation mechanism that injects noise to decorrelate dense-instance solutions, enabling a reliable reduction back to the original problem. They develop Fourier-analytic techniques to bound correlations and prove that, with high probability, a dense-instance solution translates into a sparse-instance solution, yielding tight density-time tradeoffs. The results have cryptanalytic significance by linking dense-regime hardness to sparse-average-case assumptions, with implications for security proofs and potential extensions to broader parameter ranges.
Abstract
An average-case variant of the $k$-SUM conjecture asserts that finding $k$ numbers that sum to 0 in a list of $r$ random numbers, each of the order $r^k$, cannot be done in much less than $r^{\lceil k/2 \rceil}$ time. On the other hand, in the dense regime of parameters, where the list contains more numbers and many solutions exist, the complexity of finding one of them can be significantly improved by Wagner's $k$-tree algorithm. Such algorithms for $k$-SUM in the dense regime have many applications, notably in cryptanalysis. In this paper, assuming the average-case $k$-SUM conjecture, we prove that known algorithms are essentially optimal for $k= 3,4,5$. For $k>5$, we prove the optimality of the $k$-tree algorithm for a limited range of parameters. We also prove similar results for $k$-XOR, where the sum is replaced with exclusive or. Our results are obtained by a self-reduction that, given an instance of $k$-SUM which has a few solutions, produces from it many instances in the dense regime. We solve each of these instances using the dense $k$-SUM oracle, and hope that a solution to a dense instance also solves the original problem. We deal with potentially malicious oracles (that repeatedly output correlated useless solutions) by an obfuscation process that adds noise to the dense instances. Using discrete Fourier analysis, we show that the obfuscation eliminates correlations among the oracle's solutions, even though its inputs are highly correlated.
