Intrusion Prevention through Optimal Stopping
Kim Hammar, Rolf Stadler
TL;DR
This work reframes intrusion prevention as a finite-horizon, multi-stop optimal stopping problem under partial observability, revealing that optimal defender policies have a threshold structure over a belief state. It introduces T-SPSA, a threshold-focused reinforcement-learning algorithm that learns a vector of stopping thresholds $\alpha^{*}_l$ (via a smooth policy) to maximize total reward, and demonstrates its advantages over state-of-the-art baselines. The authors implement a two-system workflow—an emulation system that captures the target infrastructure and an adjacent simulation system for policy learning—to reliably learn and validate defender policies with realistic statistics $\hat{f}_{XYZ|s}$. Empirical results show fast convergence and strong performance, with learned policies closely approaching an optimal benchmark and significantly surpassing baselines across attacker types. This framework enables practical deployment of automated intrusion prevention policies in real IT infrastructures by leveraging threshold-based control and validated emulation-based evaluation.
Abstract
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the problem of intrusion prevention as an (optimal) multiple stopping problem. This formulation gives us insight into the structure of optimal policies, which we show to have threshold properties. For most practical cases, it is not feasible to obtain an optimal defender policy using dynamic programming. We therefore develop a reinforcement learning approach to approximate an optimal threshold policy. We introduce T-SPSA, an efficient reinforcement learning algorithm that learns threshold policies through stochastic approximation. We show that T-SPSA outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms for our use case. Our overall method for learning and validating policies includes two systems: a simulation system where defender policies are incrementally learned and an emulation system where statistics are produced that drive simulation runs and where learned policies are evaluated. We show that this approach can produce effective defender policies for a practical IT infrastructure.
