Noise-Tolerant Quantum Tokens for MAC
Amit Behera, Or Sattath, Uriel Shinar
TL;DR
The paper develops noise-tolerant tokenized MACs (TMACs) based on BB84-like conjugate coding, enabling limited, revocable signing with quantum tokens. It introduces a 1-bit, noise-tolerant CTMAC construction CTMAC^η, proves unforgeability against single-token attacks, and shows a lifting framework to full-length TMACs that preserve noise tolerance under post-quantum one-way function assumptions. The security analysis combines reductions to Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion and weak certified deletion SDP bounds, yielding a 14% noise-tolerant instantiation (CTMAC^0.07) with existential unforgeability. The work further connects TMACs to practical applications like one-time memories in stateless hardware and private quantum money, and discusses fundamental limits such as the impossibility of unconditional security for polynomial tokens. Overall, the results bring practical, noise-resilient quantum signing tokens closer to feasibility while clarifying the computational assumptions and the scope of applicability to quantum money and memory devices.
Abstract
Message Authentication Code or MAC, is a well-studied cryptographic primitive that is used in order to authenticate communication between two parties sharing a secret key. A Tokenized MAC or TMAC is a related cryptographic primitive, introduced by Ben-David & Sattath (QCrypt'17) which allows limited signing authority to be delegated to third parties via the use of single-use quantum signing tokens. These tokens can be issued using the secret key, such that each token can be used to sign at most one document. We provide an elementary construction for TMAC based on BB84 states. Our construction can tolerate up to 14% noise, making it the first noise-tolerant TMAC construction. The simplicity of the quantum states required for our construction combined with its noise tolerance, makes it practically more feasible than the previous TMAC construction. The TMAC is existentially unforgeable against adversaries with signing and verification oracles (i.e., analogous to EUF-CMA security for MAC), assuming post-quantum one-way functions exist.
