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Attacking the Quantum Internet

Takahiko Satoh, Shota Nagayama, Shigeya Suzuki, Takaaki Matsuo, Michal Hajdušek, Rodney Van Meter

TL;DR

This work presents a structured threat model for the Quantum Internet by modeling quantum repeater nodes and classifying attacks through the CIA triad. It introduces a two-plane hardware model, various QNode types, and multiple link-generation schemes to pinpoint attack surfaces across quantum and classical layers. The authors analyze primitive attacks and scenarios involving hijacked QNodes, including QDDoS and framing, emphasizing quantum certification and device-independent approaches as defense vectors. The findings underscore that while confidentiality benefits from quantum mechanics, integrity and availability face novel vulnerabilities tied to classical components and network management. This framework aims to guide secure Quantum Internet architectures and motivates further taxonomy-driven mitigation strategies.

Abstract

The main service provided by the coming Quantum Internet will be creating entanglement between any two quantum nodes. We discuss and classify attacks on quantum repeaters, which will serve roles similar to those of classical Internet routers. We have modeled the components for and structure of quantum repeater network nodes. With this model, we point out attack vectors, then analyze attacks in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. While we are reassured about the promises of quantum networks from the confidentiality point of view, integrity and availability present new vulnerabilities not present in classical networks and require care to handle properly. We observe that the requirements on the classical computing/networking elements affect the systems' overall security risks. This component-based analysis establishes a framework for further investigation of network-wide vulnerabilities.

Attacking the Quantum Internet

TL;DR

This work presents a structured threat model for the Quantum Internet by modeling quantum repeater nodes and classifying attacks through the CIA triad. It introduces a two-plane hardware model, various QNode types, and multiple link-generation schemes to pinpoint attack surfaces across quantum and classical layers. The authors analyze primitive attacks and scenarios involving hijacked QNodes, including QDDoS and framing, emphasizing quantum certification and device-independent approaches as defense vectors. The findings underscore that while confidentiality benefits from quantum mechanics, integrity and availability face novel vulnerabilities tied to classical components and network management. This framework aims to guide secure Quantum Internet architectures and motivates further taxonomy-driven mitigation strategies.

Abstract

The main service provided by the coming Quantum Internet will be creating entanglement between any two quantum nodes. We discuss and classify attacks on quantum repeaters, which will serve roles similar to those of classical Internet routers. We have modeled the components for and structure of quantum repeater network nodes. With this model, we point out attack vectors, then analyze attacks in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. While we are reassured about the promises of quantum networks from the confidentiality point of view, integrity and availability present new vulnerabilities not present in classical networks and require care to handle properly. We observe that the requirements on the classical computing/networking elements affect the systems' overall security risks. This component-based analysis establishes a framework for further investigation of network-wide vulnerabilities.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 52 sections, 3 figures, 4 tables.

Figures (3)

  • Figure 1: Model of ES-type QNode-to-QNode connections. Arrows denote the movement of one half of the Bell pair.
  • Figure 5: Model of QNodes. (a) MNode must be able to measure incoming qubits in any basis. Like other QNodes, we can separate components into Quantum plane and Classical plane. (b) ENode can perform universal computations on terminal qubits. (c) An RNode connects two non-adjacent QNodes. (d) XNode connects to several QNodes and is responsible for communicating on various routes.
  • Figure 10: A network partitioned by the isolation of innocent QNodes. Red nodes denote isolated innocent nodes. The blue node denotes hijacked XNode. Solid lines denote working links. Dashed lines denote links cut by surrounding innocent nodes due to framing. The repeated success of framing leads to this situation. Due to differences in the frequency of communications, the closer a QNode is to a hijacked XNode, the more vulnerable it is.