Attacking the Quantum Internet
Takahiko Satoh, Shota Nagayama, Shigeya Suzuki, Takaaki Matsuo, Michal Hajdušek, Rodney Van Meter
TL;DR
This work presents a structured threat model for the Quantum Internet by modeling quantum repeater nodes and classifying attacks through the CIA triad. It introduces a two-plane hardware model, various QNode types, and multiple link-generation schemes to pinpoint attack surfaces across quantum and classical layers. The authors analyze primitive attacks and scenarios involving hijacked QNodes, including QDDoS and framing, emphasizing quantum certification and device-independent approaches as defense vectors. The findings underscore that while confidentiality benefits from quantum mechanics, integrity and availability face novel vulnerabilities tied to classical components and network management. This framework aims to guide secure Quantum Internet architectures and motivates further taxonomy-driven mitigation strategies.
Abstract
The main service provided by the coming Quantum Internet will be creating entanglement between any two quantum nodes. We discuss and classify attacks on quantum repeaters, which will serve roles similar to those of classical Internet routers. We have modeled the components for and structure of quantum repeater network nodes. With this model, we point out attack vectors, then analyze attacks in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. While we are reassured about the promises of quantum networks from the confidentiality point of view, integrity and availability present new vulnerabilities not present in classical networks and require care to handle properly. We observe that the requirements on the classical computing/networking elements affect the systems' overall security risks. This component-based analysis establishes a framework for further investigation of network-wide vulnerabilities.
