Session: End-To-End Encrypted Conversations With Minimal Metadata Leakage
Kee Jefferys, Maxim Shishmarev, Simon Harman
TL;DR
Session addresses metadata leakage in secure messaging by combining end-to-end encryption with onion routing and decentralised storage. It replaces phone-number-based identities with pseudonymous Ed25519 public-private keys and uses a three-hop onion request path to obscure IP addresses, backed by a stake-based Session Node network on Arbitrum. The paper introduces the Session Protocol, a bespoke encryption protocol optimized for decentralised networks, supports one-on-one and group communications with mechanisms for key rotation and blinded identities in communities. The combination offers robust privacy with scalable group sizes while preserving essential features like multi-device sync, attachments, and offline delivery, though limitations such as $PFS$ in one-on-one and traffic analysis remain challenges.
Abstract
Session is an open-source, public-key-based secure messaging application which uses a set of decentralised storage servers and an onion routing protocol to send end-to-end encrypted messages with minimal exposure of user metadata. It does this while providing the common features expected of mainstream messaging applications, such as multi-device syncing, offline inboxes, and voice/video calling.
