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Competition between service providers with strategic resource allocation: application to network slicing

Luis Guijarro, Jose R. Vidal, Vicent Pla

TL;DR

The paper analyzes competition among Network Slice Tenants (NSTs) for a shared resource pool operated by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) in 5G network slicing. It combines a Fisher-market–inspired proportional-share allocation with a discrete-choice user model to formulate a noncooperative game where NSTs strategically allocate their shares across cells. The main result is a Nash equilibrium in which each NST sets per-cell weights proportional to its share and the cell’s subscriber base, with exactness for homogeneous cells and high accuracy for heterogeneous cells, validated by extensive numerical experiments. The findings offer a tractable, privacy-friendly method for operator-level resource market design and demonstrate how capacity and sharing influence subscriber penetration and competition outcomes.

Abstract

We propose and analyze a business model for 5G operators. Each operator is entitled to a share of a network operated by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) and use network slicing mechanisms to request network resources as needed for service provision. The network operators become Network Slice Tenants (NSTs). The InP performs the resource allocation based on a vector of weights chosen strategically by each NST. The weights distribute the NST's share of resources between its subscribers in each cell. We propose a strategy profile in which the NST chooses weights equal to the product of its share by the ratio between the total number of subscribers in the cell and the total number of subscribers in the network. We characterize the proposed solution in terms of subscription ratios and fractions of subscribers, for different cell capacities and user sensitivities. The proposed solution provides the exact values for the Nash equilibrium if the cells are homogeneous in terms of normalized capacity, which is a measure of the total amount of resources available in the cell. Otherwise, if the cells are heterogeneous, it provides an accurate approximation. We quantify the deviation from the equilibrium and conclude that it is highly accurate.

Competition between service providers with strategic resource allocation: application to network slicing

TL;DR

The paper analyzes competition among Network Slice Tenants (NSTs) for a shared resource pool operated by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) in 5G network slicing. It combines a Fisher-market–inspired proportional-share allocation with a discrete-choice user model to formulate a noncooperative game where NSTs strategically allocate their shares across cells. The main result is a Nash equilibrium in which each NST sets per-cell weights proportional to its share and the cell’s subscriber base, with exactness for homogeneous cells and high accuracy for heterogeneous cells, validated by extensive numerical experiments. The findings offer a tractable, privacy-friendly method for operator-level resource market design and demonstrate how capacity and sharing influence subscriber penetration and competition outcomes.

Abstract

We propose and analyze a business model for 5G operators. Each operator is entitled to a share of a network operated by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) and use network slicing mechanisms to request network resources as needed for service provision. The network operators become Network Slice Tenants (NSTs). The InP performs the resource allocation based on a vector of weights chosen strategically by each NST. The weights distribute the NST's share of resources between its subscribers in each cell. We propose a strategy profile in which the NST chooses weights equal to the product of its share by the ratio between the total number of subscribers in the cell and the total number of subscribers in the network. We characterize the proposed solution in terms of subscription ratios and fractions of subscribers, for different cell capacities and user sensitivities. The proposed solution provides the exact values for the Nash equilibrium if the cells are homogeneous in terms of normalized capacity, which is a measure of the total amount of resources available in the cell. Otherwise, if the cells are heterogeneous, it provides an accurate approximation. We quantify the deviation from the equilibrium and conclude that it is highly accurate.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 21 sections, 12 theorems, 71 equations, 8 figures, 2 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related work
  3. Model
  4. System model
  5. Economic model
  6. Game model and analysis
  7. Setup of the numerical experiments
  8. Results and discussion
  9. Homogeneous cells
  10. Heterogeneous cells
  11. Conclusions
  12. Proofs
  13. Lemmas
  14. Proof of Proposition \ref{['prop:penetration']}
  15. Proof of Proposition \ref{['prop:penetration_normCapacity']}
  16. ...and 6 more sections

Key Result

Proposition 1

Figures (8)

  • Figure 1: Subscription ratio at the equilibrium as a function of the number of NSTs for different values of $\alpha$.
  • Figure 2: Subscription ratio at the equilibrium as a function of the number of NSTs for different values of $\gamma$.
  • Figure 3: Maximum and minimum NST 1's fraction of subscribers at the equilibrium as a function of its share.
  • Figure 4: Subscription ratio at the equilibrium as a function of the term $\sum_{t\in S}s_t^\beta$ (share equality) for different values of $\gamma$.
  • Figure 5: NST 1's weights at the equilibrium as a function of NST 1's share, compared with the proposed solution.
  • ...and 3 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (12)

  • Proposition 1
  • Proposition 2
  • Proposition 3
  • Proposition 4
  • Proposition 5
  • Proposition 6
  • Proposition 7
  • Proposition 8
  • Lemma 1
  • Lemma 2
  • ...and 2 more