Market Implementation of Multiple-Arrival Multiple-Deadline Differentiated Energy Services
Yanfang Mo, Wei Chen, Li Qiu, Pravin Varaiya
TL;DR
The paper addresses eliciting load flexibilities in power systems by introducing Multiple-Arrival Multiple-Deadline (MAMD) differentiated energy services and analyzes their forward-market implementation. It develops a rigorous feasibility and market-theory framework using a structure-tensor condition for supply-demand adequacy, a continuum social-welfare optimization, and a duality-based competitive-equilibrium construction with explicit pricing. The results establish the existence of an efficient competitive equilibrium and illustrate MAMD’s advantages over conventional benchmark services through simulations. The work provides theoretical and practical insights for market design that can enable distributed, welfare-maximizing participation of flexible loads in dynamic energy markets.
Abstract
An increasing concern in power systems is how to elicit flexibilities in demand, which leads to nontraditional electricity products for accommodating loads of different flexibility levels. We have proposed Multiple-Arrival Multiple-Deadline (MAMD) differentiated energy services for the flexible loads which require constant power for specified durations. Such loads are indifferent to the actual power delivery time as long as the duration requirements are satisfied between the specified arrival times and deadlines. The focus of this paper is the market implementation of such services. In a forward market, we establish the existence of an efficient competitive equilibrium to verify the economic feasibility, which implies that selfish market participants can attain the maximum social welfare in a distributed manner. We also show the strengths of the MAMD services by simulation.